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DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS, FINANCE
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BLACK MARKET
EXCHANGE RATE IN IRAN

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The Iranian rial has been depreciated on average about 12 per cent per annum during the last four decades. This paper examines the long- and short-run determinants of the black market exchange rate employing the cointegration techniques and the annual time series data from 1960 to 2000. Broadly consistent with previous studies, it is found that the black market exchange rate is cointegrated with inflation, real GDP and the import price index. However, in the short run only high inflation and a meagre real growth in GDP are responsible for the depreciation of Iranian currency.

1. Introduction

A volatile and constantly depreciating exchange rate can adversely affect a number of key macroeconomic variables such as private investment, GDP growth, and the demand for money. In fact, the black market exchange rate in Iran can be considered as a proxy measure of general public confidence to the performance of economy. This market forms a very important Iranian institution that operates in specific streets of Tehran and other large cities and in varied shops! One set of actors in this market may be overseas visitors, Iranians returning from trips abroad, Iranians now resident in other countries and visiting family and friends, etc. who have

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various quantities of a most valuable commodity, viz. other countries' currencies. Another set of actors comprise what can be termed "the real buyers" of these scarce commodities. This set includes businesspersons involved in international trade, particularly importers, Iranians about to travel overseas for any purposes, e.g. business trips, the provision of medical services, visiting relatives resident abroad, etc.

However, these "real buyers" will not physically undertake transactions with suppliers of other currencies on the streets. This market is characterised by middlepersons or agents, who close the link between buyers and sellers. These agents will be typically unemployed or underemployed Iranians who may well be frontpersons for wealthy opportunistic entrepreneurs who have recognised that a government policy for the price of other countries' currencies is a non-market clearing price. As the difference between the market price and the government-determined price for these commodities increased in 1995, a third set of actors, the police, entered the stage!

In both the pre- and post-revolution periods, Iran has operated a fixed exchange rate regime, albeit with periodic devaluations. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the official exchange rate between the rial and the US$ was approximately 70 rials per dollar. At that time, the gap between the official and the black market exchange rate was about 7 rials. However, the gap between the black market and the official rate has widened through time.

It is very interesting to note that since 1989 a new source of government revenue originated from the sale of foreign currencies. The exchange rate was devalued by approximately 25 per cent over the 1989-1992 period, but in spite of such a devaluation, the black market for foreign currencies persisted. The government's exchange rate policy had the effect of making the government a beneficiary of its own policy. The gap between the black market and the official rates has rendered a windfall gain for both the government and some foreign currency dealers in
the parallel market. For this reason, it is apparent that the substantial segment of "other revenue" in the government annual budget is attributable to the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market. The share of "other revenue" in the government budget increased from an average of 14 per cent in the revolutionary and war period (1978-1988) to 36.2 per cent in the four years following the end of the Iraqi war (i.e. 1989-1992). It should be noted that the Central Bank started its direct intervention in the black market in 1988 (Valadkhani, 1997).

Overestimation of government revenue and/or underestimation of expenditure, placed the Iranian government in a critical situation during the revolutionary and war period (1978-1988). On average the ratio of the budget deficit to total government expenditure trebled in this period compared to that of the oil boom period (1973-1977). In 1989 the budget deficit was so large as to represent an unprecedented rate of 51 per cent of total expenditure. This ratio was reduced to 6.7 per cent in 1993 (Nourbakhsh, 1993). It seems that the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market played a major role in this achievement!

It should also be mentioned that the black market for foreign currencies is linked very closely with the government's policies. In the 1980s the government experienced a substantial budget deficit and, as a result, government indebtedness to the Central Bank increased substantially. Under these circumstances soaring inflation was inevitable. This, in turn, amplified the gap between the official rate and the black market exchange rate for foreign currencies. For example, the gap between the official and black market exchange rates increased from an average of 175 rials per US dollar in the early 1980s to 1400 rials in 1989 (Valadkhani, 1997).

Because of this increasing gap between the official rate and the black market rate, the government devalued the rial to 1750 per US dollar in an attempt to restore an equilibrium in the foreign exchange market and foster non-oil exports. Notwithstanding the fact that Iran used a multiple-exchange-rate system in the allocation of scarce hard currency earnings, this system
was not successful. According to Farzin (1995) at one time during the war the number of exchange rates applicable to various categories of imports and exports exceeded seven.

The main reason for the deterioration in the value of the rial is the monetisation of the enormous budget deficit during and after the war. It should be mentioned that, to some extent, psychological and socio-political factors have also played an undeniable role. The growing gap between the government official and black market exchange rates directed scarce resources to unproductive sectors. The profitability of the trade sector, particularly small-scale trade such as sidewalk and small vendors, stimulated rent-seeking activities at the expense of goods-producing sectors. The currency devaluation policies also coerced economic agents, particularly the government and semi-government enterprises, into having an enormous demand for money (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1996). In other words, while the purchasing power of the rial decreases, people, including the government and semi-government enterprises, demand more money to cover their transactions. It is also argued that the income elasticity of the demand for money has decreased since the 1979 revolution. This means "the same rate of expansion in private sector liquidity is likely to have more inflationary consequences after than before the revolution" (Pesaran, 1995, p.5). This decline in income elasticity is also a manifestation of an inefficient banking system.

Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a, p. 278) points out that in 1993 the black market exchange rate was 2400 rials to the US$, involving a 30-fold depreciation of the rial. In March 1993 the Iranian government embarked upon the exchange rate unification policy with consultation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The major objective of this recent policy was to unify the multiple exchange rate regime into a single equilibrium rate by the massive intervention of the Iranian Central Bank. However, this policy has not been successful on various grounds, viz. the lack of an appropriate government social safety net to support vulnerable strata, the incorrect
initial exchange rate announced by the Central Bank, and the unsuitable timing of the unification. See Farzin (1995) for a detailed explanations of these reasons and the recent assessment of the foreign exchange reform in Iran.

Therefore, in late 1995 the Iranian authorities once again decided to administer, or implement, the existing regulations relating to the fixed exchange rate system and "cracked down" on the participants in the black market. The Iranian police, with powers to arrest both buyers and sellers, began to be active in trying to prevent transactions in this market. According to the Central Bank of Iran (2002) black market exchange rate was approximately 8002 rials to the US$ in 2002. More recently, the Banking system buys and sells foreign currencies from individuals at a rate marginally below the black market rate. Abstracting from political and social effects associated with this black market, the important question in this study is to determine the economic factors, which give rise to the prices in the black market for foreign currencies.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model is postulated, which captures the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate using both the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger representation theorem. Sources of the annual data employed as well as the unit-root results using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are discussed in Section 3. This section also presents the empirical econometric results for the long- and short-run determinants of the black market exchange rate, as well as policy implications of the study. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.

2. The Model

Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a and 1995b) has made an important empirical contribution by applying cointegration techniques in his econometric analysis of those factors that determine the
black market exchange rate. According to his empirical results, not only the consumer price index is cointegrated with the nominal stock of money, real GDP, the black market exchange rate, and the world export price index (as a proxy for import prices), but also the black market exchange rate has a long-run relationship with the consumer price index, the nominal stock of money, the real GDP, and the world export price index. Bahmani-Oskooee's policy conclusion is that the black market exchange rate cannot be stabilised unless the Iranian government seriously curbs inflation. This conclusion is also supported by Figure 1, which shows the time series data on consumer price index and the black market exchange rate for the US dollar for the period 1960-2000. It seems that there exists a vicious cycle in which a high inflation devalues the rial and a negligibly valued rial aggravates inflation. There are some empirical studies which have elucidated this cycle, for example Dadkhah (1987) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1993).

Figure 1. Consumer Price Index and the Black Market Exchange Rate

The central institutional mechanism which enables this trend to continue is the lack of independence of the Iranian Central Bank. According to Bahmani-Oskooee the independence of the Central Bank is a crucial institutional reform. In his analysis of the black market exchange
rate, Pesaran (1992) also emphasises the interaction of inflation and the rates of inflation in Iran’s major trading partners (measured by bilateral and multilateral real exchange rate indices). He shows that when Iranian prices increase more than do those of her trading partners, the black market exchange rate rises. This analysis, as does that of Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), points to the crucial factor of Iran's persistent inflation as one of the determinants of the rising price (in Iranian rials) for major international currencies. In this study the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate is specified as follows:

\[ \ln(\text{BE}_t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(P_t) + \beta_2 \ln(Y_t) + \beta_3 \ln(P_{m_t}) + e_t \]  

where \( \text{BE} \) is the black market exchange rate (the price $US in Iranian rial); \( P \) denotes the consumer price index (1982=1); \( Y \) is the real GDP (1982 prices); and \( P_{m} \) is aggregate import price deflator (1990=1) as a proxy for Iran’s trading partners’ price level.

It is important to note that this specification assumes that the impact of the nominal stock of money, as proposed by Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), is captured by the consumer price index. It is expected that the black market exchange rate decreases as the consumer price index falls, as GDP grows, and as the import price index rises. Therefore, in Iran if GDP growth is negative and if the general level of Iranian prices is higher than import prices, then the prices of foreign currencies, in rials, will rise.

In order to have a valid model for the black market exchange rate, there should be at least one cointegrating vector in the system. The Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate cointegration technique is used in this paper to test the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables specified in equation (1). A brief description of this technique is presented below.

Let us consider the following VAR of order \( q \):

\[ y_t = A_1 y_{t-1} + A_2 y_{t-2} + \cdots + A_q y_{t-q} + w_t \]  

where \( y_t \) is a \( k \)-vector of I(1) variables (e.g. in this study \( k=4 \)), and \( w_t \) is a vector of white noise.
residuals. Following Johansen (1991, 1995), equation (2) can also be rewritten as:

\[ \Delta y_t = \Pi y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{q-1} \Gamma_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \]  

(3)

where \( \Pi = \sum_{i=1}^{q} A_i - I \), and \( \Gamma_i = -\sum_{j=i+1}^{q} A_j \).

The rank \( r \) of \( \Pi \) determines the number of cointegrating vectors. If \( \Pi \) has a reduced rank \( i.e. r < k \), then there exist \( k \times r \) matrices \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) each with rank \( r \), where \( \Pi = \alpha \beta' \) and \( \beta' y_t \) is stationary. The elements of \( \alpha \) represent the adjustment parameters and each column of \( \beta \) in the literature is referred to as the cointegrating vector. Thus the important issue is how to determine the number cointegrating vectors (or \( r \)). In this paper both the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics will determine \( r \). The trace statistics test the null hypothesis of \( r \) cointegrating relations against the alternative of \( k \) cointegrating equations. On the other hand, the maximum eigenvalue statistics test the null of \( r \) cointegrating vectors versus the alternative of \( r+1 \) cointegrating relations. For more details see Johansen (1991, 1995).

Let us assume that: a) all the variables in equation (1) are I(1); b) the resulting residuals are I(0); and c) there is only one cointegrating vector in the system. According to Engle and Granger (1987), it can then be stated that there exists a corresponding error-correction mechanism (ECM or \( e_{-1} \)) model of the following form:

\[ \Delta \ln (BE_i) = \gamma_0 + \sum_{i=0}^{q_1} \gamma_{i,1} \Delta \ln (P_{i,1})_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_2} \gamma_{i,2} \Delta \ln (Y)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_3} \gamma_{i,3} \Delta \ln (P_{i,3})_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_4} \delta_i \Delta \ln (BE)_{t-i} + \theta ECM_{t-i} + \nu_i \]  

(4)

where \( \gamma_i \) are the estimated short-term coefficients; \( \theta \) represents the feedback effect or the speed of adjustment whereby short-term dynamics converge to the long-term equilibrium path indicated in equation (1); \( \delta_i \) denotes for the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable to ensure that \( \nu_i \) or the disturbance term is white noise; \( e \) or ECM is obtained from equation (1), and \( \Delta \) indicates the first-difference operator.

The general-to-specific methodology can be used to omit insignificant variables in
equation (4) on the basis of a battery of maximum likelihood tests. In this method, joint zero restrictions are imposed on explanatory variables in the unrestricted (general) model to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation process.

3. Empirical Results And Policy Implications

The sources of data for variables shown in equation (1) are Tabibian et al. (2000) and the Central Bank (2002). An important step before using the Johansen multivariate technique is to determine the time series properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use of non-stationary data in the absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression results. To this end, two unit root tests, i.e the ADF test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, have been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise, of the time series data. In this paper the lowest value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) has been used as a guide to determine the optimal lag length in the ADF regression. These lags augment the ADF regression to ensure that the error term is white noise and free of serial correlation. In addition to the ADF test, a KPSS test has been performed for all the variables. Unlike the ADF test, the KPSS test has the null of stationarity, and the alternative indicates the existence of a unit root. A lag length of two is chosen in the KPSS test for the lag truncation parameter \( l \) in the testing procedure as autocorrelation is highly likely to be of order 2 in annual data.

Prior to undertaking an empirical investigation of the major long-run determinants of the black market exchange rate, it is essential to determine the time series properties of the data. In order to make robust conclusions about stationarity or otherwise of the data, the ADF and the KPSS tests are utilised. The empirical results of the ADF and KPSS tests are summarised in Table 1. According to the results of the ADF and KPSS tests, all the three
variables of \( \ln(BE) \), \( \ln(P) \) and \( \ln(Y) \) are I(1), indicating that they become stationary after first differencing. The ADF and KPSS test results lead to conflicting results in relation to the order of integration of \( \ln(P_m) \). While the KPSS test indicates that this variable is I(1), the ADF test shows that the aggregate import price is I(2). Using the KPSS test result, it is concluded that this variables is also I(1). Given that there are only 41 annual observations in this paper, the unit root test results should be taken with a pinch of salt as all these tests are appropriate for large samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ADF test</th>
<th>KPSS Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \ln(BE) )</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>0.304*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \ln(BE) )</td>
<td>-5.50*</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ln(P) )</td>
<td>-2.33</td>
<td>0.348*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \ln(P) )</td>
<td>-3.83*</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ln(Y) )</td>
<td>-2.21</td>
<td>0.268*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \ln(Y) )</td>
<td>-3.46*</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ln(P_m) )</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.351*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \ln(P_m) )</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level.

Since all the variables in equation (1) are I(1), the Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate cointegration technique can now be used to test the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship for \( BE \). An unrestricted intercept and a linear trend in the variables but not in the cointegrating vectors enter the system. The first important step in this test is to determine the optimal lag length (q) in equation (3). Three lag selection criteria of the AIC, the final prediction error and the sequential modified LR (likelihood ratio) test statistic have been employed to determine q. Based on these criteria (not reported here but available from the author upon request), the optimal lag length is q=2.

Table 2 reports the results of the Johansen multivariate cointegration test on the black
market exchange rate as formulated in equation (1). According to both the trace and max-
eigenvalue tests there is robust evidence of one cointegrating vector at the 1 per cent level. It
should be noted that the eigenvalue associated with the first vector (0.63) is considerably
higher than those corresponding to the other vectors, thereby validating that there exists a
unique cointegrating vector in the system.

Table 2. Johansen Test for Cointegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesized No. of CE(s)</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Trace statistic</th>
<th>1% critical value</th>
<th>Max. Eigenvalue statistic</th>
<th>1% critical value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>60.2*</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>37.6*</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most 1</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most 2</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most 3</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at 1 % significance level.

Given that there is only one cointegrating vector, one can also use the Engle-Granger two
step procedure to determine the long- and short-run factors affecting the black market exchange
rate. Using the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation method, Table 3 presents the
empirical econometric results for equation (1) using the annual time series data from 1960 to
2000. In order to measure the impact of the 1979 Islamic revolution on the black market
exchange rate, \(D\) or an intercept dummy variable has also been included in the long-run
equation for \(BE\). This dummy variable takes the value of 1 for the post revolution period
(1979-2000) period, and zero otherwise.

Table 3. Results for the Long-Term Black Market Exchange Rate model, \(ln(BE_t)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimated elasticities</th>
<th>(t)-statistics(^*)</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
<th>Expected signs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(P_t)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Y_t)</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(P_m)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As seen from Table 3, all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 1 per cent level, with the only exception being $\beta_3$ (which is significant at 10% level), and have the expected theoretical signs. This equation also performs extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted $R^2$ is as high as 0.993 and the overall $F$ test rejects the null hypothesis at the one per cent level. Furthermore, this equation passes a battery of diagnostic tests and shows no sign of misspecification.

A Wald test is used to test the null hypothesis of $\beta_1=1$. The Wald test results ($F=0.21$ and probability=0.65) clearly indicate that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at 1 per cent level. Therefore, one can argue that there is almost a one-to-one relationship between the consumer price index and $BE$. In terms of the magnitude of the estimated GDP elasticity, Table 3 shows that if real GDP increases by 10 per cent, $BE$ will appreciate by 6.6 per cent. It is also found that an increase in the aggregate import price index by say 10 per cent, *ceteris paribus*, could strengthen the value of Iranian rial in the long-run by less than half a per cent. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for the intercept dummy variable is positive and highly significant, indicating that the 1979 revolution has adversely impacted on the exchange rate.
Since the estimated residuals from the long-term model are I(0), one can use the Engle and Granger representation theorem (1987) to estimate the short-term model, or equation (4). Table 4 presents the results for the vector error correction model, which captures the short-term dynamics of the black market exchange rate. The general-to-specific methodology have been adopted in estimating equation (4) by omitting insignificant lagged variables and undertaking a battery of maximum likelihood tests. Joint zero restrictions have been imposed on insignificant explanatory variables in the unrestricted (or general model) to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation process. The parsimonious short-term model of exchange rate includes all of the long-term determinants of the black market exchange rate except for \( P_m \) or the aggregate import price index. In other words, the results reported in Table 4 indicate that the short-term sources of changes in \( BE \) are the rate of inflation and the lagged real growth of GDP. All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and have the expected signs. In terms of goodness-of-fit statistics, though expressed in \( \Delta \ln(BE) \), with an adjusted \( R^2 \) of 0.70, this equation performs extremely well. As with equation (1), this equation also passes each and every diagnostic tests. Table 4 also reveals that the feed-back coefficient (or adjustment speed) is as high as –0.68 meaning that in every year 68 per cent of the divergence between the short-term black market rate from its long-term path is eliminated. As mentioned earlier, the intercept dummy variable (\( D \)) captures a regime shift in the equation for BE. It seems that this variable is highly significant in both short- and long run, supporting this view that the 1979 revolution had adversely impacted on the black market exchange rate in Iran.

Table 4. Results for the Short-Term Black Market Exchange Rate model, \( \Delta \ln(BE_t) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimated elasticities</th>
<th>( t )-statistics*</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
<th>Expected signs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

13
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>$\Delta \ln(P_t)$</th>
<th>$\Delta \ln(P_{t-1})$</th>
<th>$\Delta \ln(Y_{t-1})$</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$ecm_{t-1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>-0.777</td>
<td>-1.104</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>-0.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/</td>
<td>+/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of integration of stochastic residuals:</td>
<td>I(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Goodness-of-fit statistics:**

- Adjusted $R^2=0.696$
- Overall $F$ statistic $F=(5,33) = 18$

**Diagnostic tests:**

- DW $F(2, 31) = 0.23$ [0.80]
- ARCH 1 $F(1, 31) = 0.57$ [0.46]
- Normality $\chi^2 (2) = 2.58$ [0.28]
- White Heteroskedasticity
  - no cross term $F(9, 23) = 0.44$ [0.90]
  - with cross term $F(19, 13) = 1.42$ [0.26]
- RESET $F(1, 32) = 3.6$ [0.07]

Notes: a) Figures in square brackets show the corresponding probabilities; b) the estimation method is OLS.

### 4. Concluding Remarks

In this paper the short-term and the long-term drivers of the black market exchange rate in Iran have been examined by using annual time series data from 1960 to 2000. The Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger two-step procedure are employed to estimate and validate empirically the short- and long-term exchange rate models.

The empirical results are broadly consistent with previous studies. It is found that in the long- and short-term policies aimed at curbing the rate of inflation and stimulating the real growth of GDP can restore and strengthen Iranian currency. It seems that price changes in Iran’s trading partners have not exerted a sizable and significant impact on the black market exchange rate particularly in the short run. In sum, if Iran is to continue financing her budget deficit through monetisation, inflation can further depreciate the domestic currency on a one-to-one basis. Therefore, given the magnitudes of the long-run elasticities for inflation (+1) and GDP (-0.66), curbing inflation should be the number one priority on the policy
agenda of the Iranian government and this cannot be achieved unless the central bank of Iran operates independently.
REFERENCES


